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Abstract 
 
This article investigates the process of policy preference formation in global financial 
governance by examining the changing nature of supervision in the banking industry. The 
article argues that transparency and market-based supervision are now an integral and formal 
part of the supervision process, thus providing a public role to the private sector. The analysis 
focuses specifically at three levels of practice: official supervision in the context of the Basel 
process; private initiatives and voluntary frameworks of best practice standards; and informal 
market channels. The article shows that the private sector has used the above means to 
acquire supervision functions, thus altering the nature of supervision. The analysis highlights 
the costs and risks of active private sector involvement and calls for stronger accountability 
patterns and improved disclosure. In addition, it contrasts market-based supervisory 
arrangements with economic ideas about market discipline and shows that the mix of political 
and economic imperatives leads to a set-up where private financial institutions have the 
power of initiative but few incentives to fear market discipline. The article explains how and 
why private interests are internalised in financial policy processes and focuses on the 
existence of a transnational policy community of public and private participating actors who 
are in fundamental agreement about policy. The changing nature of supervision results from 
developments in global financial integration but also, the different ways in which global 
financial governance is generated.  
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Introduction 
Transparency and market-based supervision: defining the policy issues 
 
Recent developments in liberalisation and innovation have altered the operation of financial 
markets and consequently, fundamentally changed global financial governance, notably by 
posing significant constraints on the traditionally public functions of regulation and 
supervision. State actors are no longer capable of adequately guiding and overseeing financial 
activities that transcend national regulatory and legal boundaries. At the same time, they 
appear unwilling to reverse this pattern, for fear of harming their competitiveness.1 
Transnationalisation has not, however, relieved pubic author ities of their regulatory and 
supervisory responsibilities. Instead, the challenge is to promote market efficiency and 
stability while sharing authority with a growing number of actors, including the private 
sector. The focus has shifted from regulation to supervision and much of the emphasis placed 
on systemic stability, i.e. the prevention of crises. This has left financial institutions in charge 
of making their own rules, or rather creating their own flexible standards, and public 
authorities in charge of market-based supervision, increasingly reliant on private sector 
know-how and transparent practices. 
 
Industry actors, and in particular large and global financial conglomerates, are participating in 
the formulation and implementation of both regulation and supervision. The two are 
interlinked but distinct functions; regulation relates to the ‘establishment of specific rules of 
behaviour’ and supervision to the ‘more general oversight of financial firms’ behaviour’ 
(Goodhart et al, 1998: xvii). Self-regulatory practices have, to varied degrees, long been 
established in the financial markets. This is especially true of the securities industry but there 
have also been various cases of authority sharing among public and private actors in the 
banking industry. Self-regulatory traditions exist in many systems where ‘regulation is, 
characteristically, a public function done by private interests’ (Moran, 1991: 14). The trend 
has accelerated in recent years as best practice standards formulated and promoted by private 
groups have been widely accepted by public officials. Market-based or self-supervision, on 
the other hand, is a more novel step. Market discipline has long accompanied official efforts; 
however, transparency has been put at the centre of the supervisor y process, which also 
increasingly relies on the consistent use of internal models and risk-management techniques. 
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This article is organised in four parts. The first section explores the role of the private sector 
in the supervisory process by focusing on three levels: official procedures in the context of 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel Committee) proposals; the private 
promotion of best practice standards; and informal mechanisms of market discipline. The 
second section assesses the policy role of the private sector and examines its implications for 
efficiency and stability. The third section evaluates the consequences of market-based 
supervision for our understanding of preference formulation and global financial governance 
and analyses how the private sector has entered the policy community. Finally, the article 
examines ensuing questions of legitimacy and accountability in current financial governance 
arrangements. The argument of this article is that private sector preferences have be en 
internalised in financial policy processes; this has not necessarily happened as a result of a 
conscious strategy of capture but rather, as the consequence of the practice of public-private 
interaction and agreement among a coherent transnational policy community. 
 
Supervisory practices: ‘markets are an ally in the system of supervision’2 
 
Official recommendations and disclosure practices 
Public authorities are interested in having access to relevant information but due to expertise 
and sheer volume constraints on their authority, they are also keen to promote more 
transparency within the market. Speaking on behalf of the Federal Reserve Board, former 
Governor Laurence Meyer summarised the position of official regulators and supervisors as 
follows:  
we ha ve limited public policy choices for large and complex organisations. Choice 1: we can 
accept systemic risk as a cost of having large, global organisations in the marketplace. Choice 
2: in order to limit systemic risk, we can adopt very detailed regulation and supervision 
programmes that include a growing list of prohibitions. Choice 3: we can rely more on 
market discipline to supplement capital reforms and can maintain a level of supervision 
similar to the one we have today. Given the choices, we simply must try market discipline 
(Meyer, 2000: 2-3). 
Similarly, William McDonough (2002), former President of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York, has argued that the principal elements of supervision in the twenty-first century 
are ‘effective bank-level management; market discipline; and, official supervision’. 
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In the language of public officials, market discipline has come to be associated with 
transparency and increased disclosure. The Basel process, the principal arena for standard-
setting in global banking regulation and supervision, has been instrumental in promoting 
market-based supervision by producing frequent reports on disclosure. In a consistent effort 
to strengthen and improve transparency as a supervisory mechanism, recent studies have 
concentrated on the right balance between quantitative and qualitative disclosures, 
consistency in risk assessment and disclosure methods, and the regular release of information. 
These recommendations do not stand alone but are complemented by comprehensive regular 
surveys of industry practices. 3 Most importantly, however, the key role of market-based 
supervision can be seen in the New Capital Accord currently being finalised, the ultimate 
banking rules on capital adequacy. The revised Accord, Basel II, is being develope d through 
a lengthy consultation process with strong private sector involvement. It is built as a three-
pillar framework, each pillar dealing with minimum capital requirements, supervisory review 
procedures and market discipline respectively (Basel Committee, 2001a). Pillar 1 is 
indicative of the trend of public-private interaction and has been negotiated with financial 
institutions; it includes provisions for the use of internal risk-assessment methods for the 
most sophisticated private players. Pillar 2 focuses on the supervisory review process, 
proposing practices that will allow supervisors to evaluate banks’ risk-management 
techniques and internal procedures. Pillar 3 is at the centre of the drive towards transparency 
and the endorsement of market mecha nisms for supervisory purposes; it puts forward 
disclosure requirements and recommendations which aim to strengthen market discipline by 
allowing market participants (and hence, counterparties) to access information on risk-
management and measurement. The Basel Committee recommends quantitative and 
qualitative disclosures in the areas of capital, risk exposure and capital adequacy, and on a 
regular basis (often more than once a year). The Committee also expects that an enforcement 
mechanism will be in place , ranging from ‘moral suasion’ to reprimands and fines (Basel 
Committee, 2001b). 
 
Enhanced transparency should allow market participants to access relevant information on a 
bank’s capital adequacy and hence, its ability to absorb losses. Moreover, disclosure may 
explain a firm’s risk management and appetite for risk. Finally, comparability between 
different institutions but also among an institution over time might be improved. A close 
analysis suggests that the instruments and models disclosed contain little specific 
information. What they do, however, is provide ways to distinguish the better-managed firms, 
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or at least those who have the most sophisticated risk-management techniques at their 
disposal, and to determine institutions’ positions with respect to financial innovation. 
 
But what does market-based supervision in the form of disclosure translate to in practice? 
Despite banking industry concerns about cumbersome requirements,4 disclosure often 
involves a few extra paragraphs and additional figures in institutions’ annual reports and 
supervisory statements. There is generally a short description on the firm’s risk-management, 
pledging management understanding and compliance with internal standards. Furthermore, 
the reports include quantitative and qualitative information about different types of risk, 
including market, credit and operational risk.5 In many respects, it is the innovations in risk-
management and hence, the use of internal models for the calculation of risk and for 
regulatory purposes that lead to market-based supervision of these techniques. Calculations of 
risk use models such as value-at-risk (VaR), which provide one number that represents the 
probability of a banking institution falling below a certain pre-agreed level of losses. VaR 
models rely on historical data and base their credibility on back testing, i.e. the number of 
exceptions during a certain period of time. VaR models refer to average losses and do not 
include a worst -case estimate. For this reason, most institutions complement their models 
with stress testing, statistical models that test risk management when liquidity is low and 
capabilities are stretched. 
 
Models, of course, come with assumptions and limitations. Collecting data within global 
institutions and across time zones is challenging, compromises take place to achieve speed 
and it is a myth that institutions can get a figure at the push of a button. VaR models are in a 
way perfectly suited to current patterns of disclosure, as they provide no proprietary 
information. They tell us nothing about which markets the firm is active in, what its strategy 
is, or in which direction it is positioned. Nor do they really tell us anything about the firm’s 
risk appetite. Models can also be less than reliable as they are only as good as the people who 
operate them. Public officials are generally satisfied that most large institutions employ very 
able people but that is no guarantee that human error won’t occur. Moreover, there is a 
growing gap in expertise between those devising the models (the ‘rocket scientists’) and 
those who actually apply them to the institution’s activities. It is also useful to remember that 
financial markets are renowned for operating on the basis of ‘herd behaviour’ and decision-
makers within an institution may choose to ignore models for the sake of profitability.  
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Private sector initiatives: self-regulation and  market-based supervision 
Just as in the case of the Basel process, self -regulatory activity and the promotion of best 
practice standards by private actors lead to market-based supervision of the respective 
financial activities. The plethora of such private initiatives in recent years highlights the 
extent to which market actors have acquired regulatory and, arguably, supervisory functions. 
There have been instrument-related private sector efforts, such as those targeting derivatives 
products by the Group of Thirty and the Derivatives Policy Group.6 Specific risk types have 
also been addressed, as in the context of the Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group, 
which focused on credit risk management practices. Another private sector group, the Shipley 
Group, issued a report on disclosure practices by banks and securities firms. Finally, a wide 
variety of established business associations have taken ove r a standard-setting regulatory role 
at various stages of the policy process. The Institute of International Finance, for example, a 
global banking association that concentrates its efforts on international agreements such as 
Basel II, has played an active consultative and lobbying role in the drafting, revising and 
finalising of the Accord, as well as providing additional guidance on disclosure. What these 
initiatives have in common is the frequent head start of the private sector in a variety of vital 
financial policy issues. While they have been more or less influential in final policy 
outcomes, they have taken centre stage in the debates and given legitimacy to private sector 
involvement in the making of regulation. These self-regulatory initiatives also included 
specific proposals for voluntary frameworks for enhanced and increased disclosure as the 
basis for supervision of the financial activities in question. Though improvements in 
transparency are to be welcomed, the limitations outlined with respect to Pillar 3 also apply to 
private sector initiatives. 
 
Market discipline, market actors and informal channels 
Transparency and market-based supervision are further facilitated by more informal 
mechanisms. Firstly, there are a limited number of institutions  large enough to have the 
potential to cause systemic risk (systemic risk refers to cross-infection from a problem in one 
part of the system). Financial activity is concentrated among a small cluster of financial 
institutions that have developed sizeable exposures to each other. This trend is rationalised by 
the willingness of all banks to have highly rated counterparties. As a result, there are under 
twenty banks, mainly New York-based, which are responsible for the bulk of financial 
operations. A bank’s geographical location is relevant, as Wall Street is a small and tight 
community with several informal channels of communication. There are flows of information 
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and gossip, which allow institutions to know a fair amount about each other’s activities. Such 
anecdotal evidence can be especially useful with respect to the larger institutions. Banks also 
gain market knowledge by competing for the same clients; in turn, this can make them copy 
respective positions. Finally, there is the issue of frequent movement of employees 
(especially loan officers and traders) who take with them expertise but also, some proprietary 
information.7 
 
Market discipline itself can also be a strong supervisory tool. The near -failure of Bankers 
Trust, an investment bank, at the height of the over-the-counter derivatives scandals of the 
mid-1990s was a poignant reminder of how a respected institution can find itself in an 
uncomfortable situation and probably saved the industry a lot of money. 8 This led to more 
responsible risk management but also gave banks the incentive to monitor other banks 
(especially their major counterparties). 
 
Other market actors can ensure sound practices, notably rating agencies, which generally do 
the important job of cross -examining managers over the numbers produced by the models 
they use. 9 The market also signals the robust health or doubtful standing of an institution in 
the form of equity analyst reports or the interest rate that a bank has to pay on its debt.  
 
These measures are not conclusive but they do constitute useful transparency mechanisms. In 
fact, in the case of some of the larger financial institutions, the market tends to identify 
problems first whereas supervisors might choose to ignore signals because of political 
considerations.10 Finally, pas t crises have demonstrated that available information is by no 
means a sufficient condition for stability; both market participants and public officials need to 
be prepared to look for and at the information and also, take the time to interpret it sensibly. 
 
A policy role for the private sector 
 
Private authority is not a novel phenomenon in financial governance. There has long existed a 
pattern of dialogue and interaction between the public and private sectors, and a tradition of 
self-regulation in the securities and banking industries. Nevertheless, the crash of 1929 and 
the consequent depression brought about strong public agencies and, despite private sector 
involvement, for most of the twentieth century, there was some clarity with regards to public 
and private functions, with regulation and supervision firmly in the hands of public 
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authorities. The above analysis shows that the balance has shifted and that the private sector 
has not only acquired a formal regulatory role but also, a supervisory one.  
 
But what does the term ‘private sector’ actually refer to? With respect to Basel II, but also in 
relation to the growing emphasis on transparency and market-based supervision, the process 
is essentially led by US banking industry concerns, those of large financial institutions in 
particular. Their preferences for market-generated standards and market-based oversight 
solutions have been internalised in the Basel process, and as a result, large sophisticated 
banks are the best placed and best suited to the ensuing proposals. This is especially 
important in light of recent developments with regards to the adoption of Basel II; US 
regulators have decided to apply the new rules only to the top ten banks on the basis that they 
are too costly for smaller players. Banks in other regulatory spheres, notably in the European 
Union, will not enjoy the same dispensation. 
 
It is also important to differentiate between ‘private sector’ and ‘market’ and consequently, 
between private sector preferences and market discipline. Is market discipline pursued 
seriously by either the public or the private sectors? In fact, some opponents of Basel II argue 
that the latter is not going far enough in the direction of market discipline and advocate a 
subordinated debt requirement, whereby banks would need to secure their assets with a 
proportion of uninsured long-term subordinated debt; the yields on this debt would indicate 
both risk appetite and market circumstances (Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee, 
2001). In economic terms, market discipline amounts to much more than transparency and 
disclosure: ‘transparency of risk and capital positions; incentives to process information; 
formulation of unbiased estimates of the probability of default reflected in appropriate price 
and quantity sanctions; and bank responses to increase in price and/or reduction in quantity 
by reducing exposure or increasing capital’.11 This means that not only must there be 
adequate information available to market participants but also, that these participants must be 
at risk of loss and that a negative market view of a financial institution must have significant 
effects. It becomes apparent that policy proposals do not deal with most of these issues and 
that indeed, most of what is interesting and potentially effective about market discipline 
would be taking place outside the Basel process. There are, indeed, significant limits to 
market discipline, such as the existence of safety nets and deposit insurance, and the central 
bank function of lender of last resort, especially for institutions that are ‘too-big-to-fail’. 
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These are strong political functions and considerations, which also provide a great degree of 
security to the private sector. 
 
As a result, concerns remain as to how responsibly the private sector takes its policy role, as 
well as with regards to the safeguards that are in place should something go wrong. The 
probability of failure for a financial institution cannot and should not be driven to zero, but in 
the current financial environment, the private sector enjoys a great degree of autonomy 
without assuming a corresponding level of responsibility; the public sector is (or will be) thus 
left with the task of picking up the pieces when private sector decisions prove detrimental to 
the stability of the financial system. 
 
In the first place, this financial structure can lead to moral hazard; global banks can rip the 
benefits of their involvement in the making of regulation and the conducting of supervision 
but also fall back on the state in times of problems. Public authorities have traditionally 
assumed functions of lender-of-last resort for illiquid institutions and provided a safety net 
for depositor protection. More awkward is the more unofficial role of central banks as 
rescuers of insolvent institutions that are considered ‘too-big-to-fail’.12 Indeed, because of the 
tradition of providing liquidity support, central banks can find that they are providing a 
‘significant subsidy to the risk management industry’ (Steinherr, 1998: 276). The rescue of 
the US hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management in 1998, with private money but Federal 
Reserve logistical support indicates that there may be an increasing number of big players 
that matter to systemic stability. The Federal Reserve may not have used public money that 
time but its intervention still hints that it is prepared to act decisively to avoid a crisis. This 
may leave some in the private sector off the hook. Finally, it is important to look at the wider 
economic context. Failures can affect actors with no direct participation in the operation of 
global financial markets; this has been acknowledged by policy-makers:  
following a wave of financial liberalisation, the financial system has come to play a much 
larger role in the allocation of resources than was the case twenty-five years ago. The 
capacity of financial system weaknesses to generate strains and even crisis has therefore 
grown. So have the real economic consequences when the system malfunctions. 13 
 
The adoption of self-supervision practices (as well as  self-regulatory ones) was arguably 
facilitated by the economic climate of the 1990s. After numerous financial system glitches in 
the 1980s, economic fundamentals in the last decade were sound and the financial system 
 11 
overall was considered to be healthy (especially in its ‘Anglo-American’ form). Stock 
markets performed remarkably and confidence in the market was high. This gave the Federal 
Reserve considerable room for manoeuvre to push its preference for self-regulation and 
market-based supervision. The underlying assumption was that economic climate allowed for 
small indiscretions.14 The framework was further enabled by the status of Alan Greenspan, 
Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, not just in the financial policy community, but also 
in the wider government and legislative circles (Sicilia and Cruikshank, 2000). There was, 
however, a shift in market circumstances, accompanied by a crisis of public confidence 
following the corporate scandals of 2002. While the full involvement of large financial 
institutions in these debacles has not been fully established, the lack of transparency and the 
problematic role of auditing firms are cause for concern. Are these the people who are asking 
us to trust them?  
 
In the banking industry, the private sector is writing its own script, increasingly influencing 
not just the function of regulation but also that of supervision. Private actors are contributing 
towards and sometimes defining the emerging structure of the financial system but currently, 
they are taking advantage of their position without making themselves fully accountable. 
Along with improved disclosure, the issue of clearer patterns of responsibility, and that of a 
more open and visible policy role for the private sector need to be urgently addressed.  
 
The private sector exerts significant influence over its own regulation and supervision:  
Financial crashes occur because of collective abandonment of common sense by the market. 
The history of finance, from the tulip mania of 1637 to the dotcom bubble, is full of such 
lapses. Only a captured regulator could conclude that an industry of such systemic 
importance, so prone to mutual self-delusion, is ready for more self-regulation (Persaud, 
2002). 
This paper argues that, in fact, the current financial environment encourages not only self-
regulation but also, self-supervision. Private interests have been internalised by the policy 
community and the consequences of such private sector policy involvement are not being 
appropriately assessed.  
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Understanding global financial governance  
 
The influence and authority of the private sector over its regulation and supervision have 
affected the wider context of global financial governance. Private institutions, individually or 
through membership of various industry associations and other private groupings, help shape 
policy preferences because they are now part of the policy community. Members of the 
community appear to have common goals and similar beliefs and present a unified front; 
whereas some debate may indeed be taking place about the public-private balance within the 
community, no one is openly questioning the general benefits of the interaction, nor indeed, 
of the main policy orientations that it entails. As a result, the level of controversy that is often 
associated with important and potentially explosive financial issues is not fully reflected in 
the making of policy. In this context, the influence of the private sector participation is seen 
as legitimate. Legitimacy stems from the situation of ‘revolving doors’ among financial 
sector employees; eventually, those in charge of regulation and supervision and those 
representing the financial institutions being regulated and supervised are the same group of 
people. Most importantly, however, the complexity and speed of financial innovation has put 
banks in a privileged position as knowledge holders. Public authorities lag behind in terms of 
technical capabilities and expertise. If regulators and supervisors can’t keep up with the 
development of financial products that are complex, often tailor-made and used by a variety 
of institutions and firms, they cannot regulate nor supervise effectively. As a result, private 
initiatives gradually take over important functions and promote standards based on private 
practice. This transfer of authority is further assisted by the reputation of ‘finance’ as 
complicated and technical. Financial issues attract limited attention as evidenced by the ‘low 
domestic visibility of the issue of financial liberalisation among politicians and the general 
public’ (Helleiner, 1994: 14). This has helped to de -politicise global financial matters and to 
account for public-private dynamics in the making of policy in technical terms (Picciotto and 
Haines, 1999). 
 
But why is there such underlying agreement among public and private sector officials on 
transparency and market-based supervision? This conformity is based on public and private 
sector representatives belonging to the same financial policy community; public officials and 
practitioners have common e ducational and professional backgrounds and regularly meet and 
network in their professional capacity. 15 In Cerny’s analysis,  
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both formal and informal private organisations and relationships, which themselves are 
organised more and more around internationa l competition and transnational linkages, come 
to set standards and to shape practices (including ‘best practice’ and ‘benchmarking’) which 
are then transmitted in a feedback process at domestic, transnational and international levels 
through both private and state action operating in mutually reinforcing ways (Cerny, 2002: 
202). 
Moreover, ‘transnational policy communities of experts and professionals that share their 
expertise and information and form common patterns of understanding regarding policy 
through regular interaction’ bring about ‘policy convergence’ (Stone, 2001). Contact can be 
formal, as in the case of the Basel Committee, semi-formal, in the context of private 
association meetings, or informal, based on personal relations and unofficial interaction. This 
concentration of specialist policy-makers facilitates agreement among the members of the 
policy community but also acts as an exclusion zone for alternative points of view. 
 
What does this mean for our understanding of financial governance? Public and private actors 
advance market structures, which promote private interests and moreover, move policy-
making procedures to the transnational level, leading to policy harmonisation. In this context, 
going beyond sterile distinctions of ‘public and private’ enhances our understanding of global 
financial governance and reveals that public and private are working together to get markets 
to operate in a certain manner and that their combined decisions have an impact on the 
relative balance of public and private in the proceedings. In turn, this suggests that those 
same actors and the policy community could express preference for alternative market 
structures and a different degree of private sector influence. The market is a policy tool 
(Pauly, 2002) and the transnational policy community is made up of both public and private 
actors; it is thus possible to conceive of the balance shifting again and of state actors 
reasserting authority (Weiss, 2003). 
 
Bringing the politics back in? Legitimacy and accountability 
 
When examining the legitimacy of global financial governance arrangements, we also need to 
look at the legitimacy of policy priorities, actors and the structure as a whole. The analysis of 
this article shows that the policies that make up global financial governance are accepted as 
legitimate primarily as a result of the high level of expertise involved in the policy process. 
But does this make policy priorities legitimate? The transnational policy community focuses 
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on efficiency and stability over social or distributive justice, which is also a public good 
(Kapstein, 1999). In practice, this means a shift of economic policies and a phasing-out of the 
welfare role of the state in favour of support of the private sector. These conflicts are not 
new: Polanyi (1944) provided an account of nineteenth century finance which highlighted 
tensions and attempts to reconcile laissez-faire economics and an active social role for the 
state.  
 
Inevitably, these policy priorities produce winners and losers. In other aspects of economic 
governance, policy outcomes in terms of winners and losers are easily apparent; Sell’s (2003) 
analysis on the influence of private actors over the regime of intellectual property protection 
shows a clear impact on the ability of states in the developing world to tackle health issues 
and the HIV/AIDS crisis in particular. The identification of ‘losers’ in the politics of banking 
supervision is more subtle; the failure of regulation and supervision can impact workers who 
become unemployed as a result of a currency crisis or taxpayers who have to bail out 
insolvent financial institutions (Porter, 2001). More generally, Cutler et al. (1999: 369) argue 
that private actor authority leads to decisions about ‘who gets to play, what are the limits on 
play, and often who wins’.   
 
The legitimacy of actors in the current arrangements is equally problematic. Authority is 
linked to legitimacy (Friedman, 1990). Hurd (1999) argues that the ‘operative process in 
legitimation is the internalisation by the actor of an external standard’, a standard other than 
self-interest. In global financial governance, external standards tend to revolve around 
stability and efficiency and, thus, are too closely linked to private sector interests. This also 
has consequences for the legitimacy of public actors: ‘when states delegate effective authority 
to actors in private markets, both the act of delegation and the future performance of those 
actors have implications for their own continued legitimacy’ (Pauly, 1997). The state’s 
relations with its non-financial constituencies are thus compromised.  
 
Finally, what is the legitimacy of the structure of global financial governance? Germain 
(2001) proposes the principle of inclusion as a way to enhance legitimacy. While it is the  case 
that the institutional framework became more inclusive in the aftermath of the Asian financial 
crisis, the core of governance arrangements is, however, still inhabited by a relatively small 
number of financial institutions and public authorities with a strong North American and 
European bias. 
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The legitimacy of non-state actor influence and authority becomes more problematic when 
we examine accountability patterns relating to the activities of these actors. This is 
particularly true in global finance, where policy-making remains ‘esoteric’ and leads to a 
‘limited democracy’ (Coleman, 1996: 10). Against this background, the ‘power of the vote in 
shaping public policy decreases’ (Reinicke, 1997) while at the same time, the private actors 
that hold authority are not part of a mechanism that assigns appropriate responsibility. 
‘Market actors are neither elected nor politically accountable’ (Cohen, 1999). In this context, 
who, or what, are policy-makers (public and private) accountable to? It would be tempting to 
answer that the main accountability mechanism is the ‘market’. Nevertheless, when losses 
happen, or crises occur, market mechanisms do not always take over by inflicting 
‘punishment’ or ‘discipline’. Instead, the public sector does act to remedy problems and its 
interference affects a wider set of actors in ways that are not explicitly recognised by the 
governance framework. This is further evidence that who exercises authority matters and that 
in the current financial governance arrangements, under the pretext of market efficiency, 
private interests have been internalised by the transnational policy community.  
 
Conclusions 
This paper has provided an overview of trends and practices in the supervision of financial 
markets and has shown that the policy process is influenced by private sector preferences, as 
evidenced in the promotion of market-based arrangements. Furthermore it has offered an 
explanation of this development based on an understanding of transnational policy 
communities of public and private actors that transcends traditional distinctions of public and 
private. This has significant implications for our understanding of financial governance and 
we need to think further about questions of capture of the policy process. 
 
In identifying the market mechanisms favoured by this policy community, the paper also 
comes to the conclusion that despite talk of the de-politicisation of global finance, politics 
and private interest coincide to produce a supervisory set-up that is far from the ideal of 
market discipline. The existence of safety nets and lender of last resort functions of central 
banks remove the prospect of efficient market discipline yet there is little evidence of serious 
proposals that would limit safety nets or reduce insured deposits. Moreover, principles of 
corporate governance, despite the recent plethora of examples of ‘bad practice’ from the 
corporate world have yet to be included in policy discussions on the banking industry. This 
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means that we need to distinguish between neoliberal economic principles and the politics of 
neoliberalism and that the issue of accountability of the private sector remains problematic. 
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unwilling) to fulfil its obligations. Operational risk refers to failure due to faulty or outdated technical equipment 
or human error, including inadequate separation of front and back offices  and unclear lines of accountability. 
6 For an analysis of these initiatives, see Tsingou (2003). 
7 Observations based on interviews with US public officials. 
8 Confidential interview with official at the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, US. 
9 For an analysis of the role of rating agencies, see Sinclair (2001). 
10 Interviews with public officials and industry representatives substantiate this point. 
11 Richard Herring, ‘How Can the Invisible Hand Strengthen Prudential Supervision? And How Can Prudential 
Supervision Strengthen the Invisible Hand?’ Remarks made at the Conference on Market Discipline, 
cosponsored by the Bank for International Settlements and the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Chicago, 
USA, 31 October 2003. 
12 Interviews with US public officials have shown that there exists an informal distinction between the legal 
possibility of the failure of a large financial institution and the economic one. 
13 Andrew Crockett, ‘International standard setting in financial supervision’, Lecture at the Cass Business 
School, City University, London 5 February 2003. Andrew Crockett is the former General Manager of the Bank 
for International Settlements. 
14 Confidential interview with Federal Reserve official. 
15 See also Gill (1990) and van der Pijl (1998). 
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